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thirdparty,net.mbedtls: update mbedtls to latest compatible version v3.3.0 (#21118)

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Turiiya 2024-03-28 07:46:21 +01:00 • committed by GitHub
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156 changed files with 16293 additions and 4396 deletions
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343
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c vendored
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@ -26,13 +26,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#include <stdlib.h>
#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
#define mbedtls_free free
#endif
#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
#include "ssl_misc.h"
@ -388,30 +382,80 @@ static int ssl_parse_inner_plaintext( unsigned char const *content,
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
/* `add_data` must have size 13 Bytes if the CID extension is disabled,
* and 13 + 1 + CID-length Bytes if the CID extension is enabled. */
/* The size of the `add_data` structure depends on various
* factors, namely
*
* 1) CID functionality disabled
*
* additional_data =
* 8: seq_num +
* 1: type +
* 2: version +
* 2: length of inner plaintext +
*
* size = 13 bytes
*
* 2) CID functionality based on RFC 9146 enabled
*
* size = 8 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 6 + 2 + CID-length
* = 23 + CID-length
*
* 3) CID functionality based on legacy CID version
according to draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
*
* size = 13 + 1 + CID-length
*
* More information about the CID usage:
*
* Per Section 5.3 of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 the
* size of the additional data structure is calculated as:
*
* additional_data =
* 8: seq_num +
* 1: tls12_cid +
* 2: DTLSCipherText.version +
* n: cid +
* 1: cid_length +
* 2: length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext
*
* Per RFC 9146 the size of the add_data structure is calculated as:
*
* additional_data =
* 8: seq_num_placeholder +
* 1: tls12_cid +
* 1: cid_length +
* 1: tls12_cid +
* 2: DTLSCiphertext.version +
* 2: epoch +
* 6: sequence_number +
* n: cid +
* 2: length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext
*
*/
static void ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( unsigned char* add_data,
size_t *add_data_len,
mbedtls_record *rec,
mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version
tls_version,
tls_version,
size_t taglen )
{
/* Quoting RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2):
/* Several types of ciphers have been defined for use with TLS and DTLS,
* and the MAC calculations for those ciphers differ slightly. Further
* variants were added when the CID functionality was added with RFC 9146.
* This implementations also considers the use of a legacy version of the
* CID specification published in draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05,
* which is used in deployments.
*
* We will distinguish between the non-CID and the CID cases below.
*
* --- Non-CID cases ---
*
* Quoting RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2):
*
* additional_data = seq_num + TLSCompressed.type +
* TLSCompressed.version + TLSCompressed.length;
*
* For the CID extension, this is extended as follows
* (quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05,
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05):
*
* additional_data = seq_num + DTLSPlaintext.type +
* DTLSPlaintext.version +
* cid +
* cid_length +
* length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;
*
* For TLS 1.3, the record sequence number is dropped from the AAD
* and encoded within the nonce of the AEAD operation instead.
* Moreover, the additional data involves the length of the TLS
@ -427,11 +471,72 @@ static void ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( unsigned char* add_data,
*
* TLSCiphertext.length = TLSInnerPlaintext.length + taglen.
*
*/
* --- CID cases ---
*
* RFC 9146 uses a common pattern when constructing the data
* passed into a MAC / AEAD cipher.
*
* Data concatenation for MACs used with block ciphers with
* Encrypt-then-MAC Processing (with CID):
*
* data = seq_num_placeholder +
* tls12_cid +
* cid_length +
* tls12_cid +
* DTLSCiphertext.version +
* epoch +
* sequence_number +
* cid +
* DTLSCiphertext.length +
* IV +
* ENC(content + padding + padding_length)
*
* Data concatenation for MACs used with block ciphers (with CID):
*
* data = seq_num_placeholder +
* tls12_cid +
* cid_length +
* tls12_cid +
* DTLSCiphertext.version +
* epoch +
* sequence_number +
* cid +
* length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext +
* DTLSInnerPlaintext.content +
* DTLSInnerPlaintext.real_type +
* DTLSInnerPlaintext.zeros
*
* AEAD ciphers use the following additional data calculation (with CIDs):
*
* additional_data = seq_num_placeholder +
* tls12_cid +
* cid_length +
* tls12_cid +
* DTLSCiphertext.version +
* epoch +
* sequence_number +
* cid +
* length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext
*
* Section 5.3 of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 (for legacy CID use)
* defines the additional data calculation as follows:
*
* additional_data = seq_num +
* tls12_cid +
* DTLSCipherText.version +
* cid +
* cid_length +
* length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext
*/
unsigned char *cur = add_data;
size_t ad_len_field = rec->data_len;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \
MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0
const unsigned char seq_num_placeholder[] = { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff };
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
if( tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 )
{
@ -445,25 +550,72 @@ static void ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( unsigned char* add_data,
{
((void) tls_version);
((void) taglen);
memcpy( cur, rec->ctr, sizeof( rec->ctr ) );
cur += sizeof( rec->ctr );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \
MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0
if( rec->cid_len != 0 )
{
// seq_num_placeholder
memcpy( cur, seq_num_placeholder, sizeof(seq_num_placeholder) );
cur += sizeof( seq_num_placeholder );
// tls12_cid type
*cur = rec->type;
cur++;
// cid_length
*cur = rec->cid_len;
cur++;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
{
// epoch + sequence number
memcpy( cur, rec->ctr, sizeof( rec->ctr ) );
cur += sizeof( rec->ctr );
}
}
// type
*cur = rec->type;
cur++;
// version
memcpy( cur, rec->ver, sizeof( rec->ver ) );
cur += sizeof( rec->ver );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
if( rec->cid_len != 0 )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \
MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 1
if (rec->cid_len != 0)
{
memcpy( cur, rec->cid, rec->cid_len );
// CID
memcpy(cur, rec->cid, rec->cid_len);
cur += rec->cid_len;
// cid_length
*cur = rec->cid_len;
cur++;
// length of inner plaintext
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ad_len_field, cur, 0);
cur += 2;
}
else
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \
MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0
if( rec->cid_len != 0 )
{
// epoch + sequence number
memcpy(cur, rec->ctr, sizeof(rec->ctr));
cur += sizeof(rec->ctr);
// CID
memcpy( cur, rec->cid, rec->cid_len );
cur += rec->cid_len;
// length of inner plaintext
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ad_len_field, cur, 0 );
cur += 2;
}
@ -538,7 +690,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_mode_t ssl_mode;
int auth_done = 0;
unsigned char * data;
unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ];
/* For an explanation of the additional data length see
* the description of ssl_extract_add_data_from_record().
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
unsigned char add_data[23 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX];
#else
unsigned char add_data[13];
#endif
size_t add_data_len;
size_t post_avail;
@ -1021,13 +1180,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
size_t sign_mac_length = 0;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/*
* MAC(MAC_write_key, seq_num +
* TLSCipherText.type +
* TLSCipherText.version +
* length_of( (IV +) ENC(...) ) +
* IV +
* ENC(content + padding + padding_length));
/* MAC(MAC_write_key, add_data, IV, ENC(content + padding + padding_length))
*/
if( post_avail < transform->maclen)
@ -1124,7 +1277,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
mbedtls_record *rec )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD)
size_t olen;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */
mbedtls_ssl_mode_t ssl_mode;
int ret;
@ -1133,7 +1288,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
size_t padlen = 0, correct = 1;
#endif
unsigned char* data;
unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ];
/* For an explanation of the additional data length see
* the description of ssl_extract_add_data_from_record().
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
unsigned char add_data[23 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX];
#else
unsigned char add_data[13];
#endif
size_t add_data_len;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
@ -1669,15 +1831,15 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
/*
* The next two sizes are the minimum and maximum values of
* data_len over all padlen values.
*
* They're independent of padlen, since we previously did
* data_len -= padlen.
*
* Note that max_len + maclen is never more than the buffer
* length, as we previously did in_msglen -= maclen too.
*/
* The next two sizes are the minimum and maximum values of
* data_len over all padlen values.
*
* They're independent of padlen, since we previously did
* data_len -= padlen.
*
* Note that max_len + maclen is never more than the buffer
* length, as we previously did in_msglen -= maclen too.
*/
const size_t max_len = rec->data_len + padlen;
const size_t min_len = ( max_len > 256 ) ? max_len - 256 : 0;
@ -1801,8 +1963,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want )
if( ssl->f_recv == NULL && ssl->f_recv_timeout == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() "
"or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() " ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
@ -1912,7 +2073,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "timeout" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 );
if( mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over( ssl ) == 0 )
if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
{
if( ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( ssl ) != 0 )
{
@ -2017,8 +2178,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
if( ssl->f_send == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() "
"or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() " ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
@ -3487,7 +3647,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
{
/* Shift pointers to account for record header including CID
* struct {
* ContentType special_type = tls12_cid;
* ContentType outer_type = tls12_cid;
* ProtocolVersion version;
* uint16 epoch;
* uint48 sequence_number;
@ -3851,8 +4011,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
if( ssl_record_is_in_progress( ssl ) == 0 )
{
int dtls_have_buffered = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
int have_buffered = 0;
/* We only check for buffered messages if the
* current datagram is fully consumed. */
@ -3860,11 +4020,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 0 )
{
if( ssl_load_buffered_message( ssl ) == 0 )
have_buffered = 1;
dtls_have_buffered = 1;
}
if( have_buffered == 0 )
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
if( dtls_have_buffered == 0 )
{
ret = ssl_get_next_record( ssl );
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING )
@ -3938,7 +4098,7 @@ static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
if( hs == NULL )
return( -1 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_messsage" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_message" ) );
if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
@ -5288,6 +5448,50 @@ static int ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_check_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
if( ( ssl->in_hslen == mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) ||
( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ) )
{
return( 0 );
}
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "NewSessionTicket received" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_handle_hs_message_post_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "received post-handshake message" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
{
int ret = ssl_tls13_check_new_session_ticket( ssl );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
/* Fail in all other cases. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
/* This function is called from mbedtls_ssl_read() when a handshake message is
* received after the initial handshake. In this context, handshake messages
* may only be sent for the purpose of initiating renegotiations.
@ -5298,7 +5502,7 @@ static int ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
* TLS 1.3 in the future without bloating the logic of mbedtls_ssl_read().
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
static int ssl_tls12_handle_hs_message_post_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
@ -5380,18 +5584,39 @@ static int ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "refusing renegotiation, sending alert" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
/* Check protocol version and dispatch accordingly. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
if( ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 )
{
return( ssl_tls13_handle_hs_message_post_handshake( ssl ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ssl->tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 )
{
return( ssl_tls12_handle_hs_message_post_handshake( ssl ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
/* Should never happen */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
/*
* Receive application data decrypted from the SSL layer
@ -5443,7 +5668,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
}
#endif
if( mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over( ssl ) == 0 )
if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
{
ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl );
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO &&
@ -5699,7 +5924,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_
}
#endif
if( mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over( ssl ) == 0 )
if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{